




# The NIMBY Problem



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# site fights

*DIVISIVE FACILITIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY  
IN JAPAN AND THE WEST*

**DANIEL P. ALDRICH**



# Puzzle

How do states handle siting controversial facilities?

Stage 1: Picking sites

Stage 2: Responding to local protest

# Picking Sites: Nuclear Plants in Japan



# 6 Approaches to Site Selection

<i>Explanation</i>	<i>Logic</i>
<b>Technocratic Criteria</b>	Geology and geography determine sites
<b>Partisan discrimination</b>	Dominant political party punishes political opponents
<b>Discrimination against Minorities</b>	Racial/ethnic majority punishes minority
<b>Economics</b>	Wealthy neighborhoods push away facilities; poorer ones seek potential jobs, taxes, and income
<b>Political intervention</b>	Strong politicians bring home what they see as “pork” or push away “bads”
<b>Civil Society</b>	Mobilization against facilities depends upon quality and quantity of social capital

# Testing the Hypotheses

Rare event logit (relogit) regression with selection/exclusion for siting as dependent variable

Ordered probit analyses using weighting as second-level check

# Measuring Civil Society

Based on internal MITI memos and interviews


## Quantity of Civil Society

- Ideally, change in voluntary associations' membership over time
- Available: change in primary sector employment

## Quality of Civil Society


- Draw on sociological studies of population change

# ↑ Civil Society, ↓ Probability of Selection as Host



N = 188


# ↓ Solidarity, ↑ Probability of Selection as Host



N = 188

↑ Civil Society,

↓ Probability of Selection as Host



N = 67



# Standard explanations: State Response to Protest


Time period: Calder (1988), Noakes (2001)

Bureaucratic culture: Zysman (1983), Otake  
(2000)

Statutory environment: Boyle (1998), Upham  
(1976)

# Increase in Expropriation against Weaker Civil Society

Total Approved Expropriation Applications per Year in Japan




# The Machiavellian State: Tools as a Function of Civil Society

	State Tools
Weak Civil Society	<i>Coercion and hard social control</i> Examples: expropriation and state violence in French nuclear power plant siting, U.S. dam siting and Japanese airport siting
Moderate Levels of Civil Society	<i>Soft social control and minor incentives</i> Examples: closing of access points and small scale grants in French and Japanese dam siting
Strong Civil Society	<i>Incentives and soft social control</i> Examples: grants, educational programs, award ceremonies in Japanese nuclear power plant siting

# Nuclear Power Plant Siting in Japan: Varieties of Persuasion



# Nuclear Power Plant Siting in Japan: Varieties of Persuasion



# Nuclear Power Plant Siting in Japan: Varieties of Persuasion



# Nuclear Power Plant Siting in France: Coercion

## les blindés à Plogoff pourquoi ?



# Conclusions

States may envision strong civil society as a liability, as they **avoid** strong civil society when choosing locations

States more likely to use coercion against weak civil society

# Conclusions

Importance of competition between state and civil society: states alter policy instruments only under sustained contestation

Local Japanese civil society has an impact on national energy policy to some degree